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CENTRAL ISSUE
The central issue before this court is whether giving notice
pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) is an element of plaintiff's prima
facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, or an
"avoidance or affirmative defense" that must be raised by
defendant.
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 under defendant's "Statement of

Facts" are inappropriate since plaintiff's first set of
interrogatories and request for production of documents were not
part of the trial record below.

(See Addendum to Brief of

Appellee, Michael Kampros, pp 2-7.)

There was also no record

below as to what documents were or were not produced pursuant
thereto. Id.
2.

Paragraph 17 under defendant's "Statement of Facts" is

accurate.

However, it should be noted that the Amended Judgment

was paid and a Satisfaction of Judgment filed on stipulation of
counsel that plaintiff's right to pursue this appeal would not be
limited thereby.
ARGUMENT
I.

A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER
38-1-18 DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF MAILING
UNDER SECTION 38-1-7(3).

As developed in pages 7-12 of Appellant's Brief, a prima
facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 does not
require proof of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3).
1

A claim that

Section 38-1-7(3) was not complied wLth is an "avoidance or
affirmative defense" that must be raLsed by defendant.
In response thereto, defendant alleges that 1) caselaw from
other jurisdictions indicates otherwise, 2) the Utah cases of AAA
Fencing Co. vs. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah
1986) and Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163
(Utah App. 1990) indicate otherwise, and 3) the general rules for
determining the elements of a prima facie case for statutory
claims are different than for common law claims.

In fact, none

of these are true.
A.

The Caselaw Cited By Defendant From Other Jurisdictions

Is Inapposite.
Defendant cites cases interpreting notice requirements under
mechanic's lien laws in Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Kansas and
Arizona.

None of those cases are applicable here.

In the

Colorado case, the court held that language specific to the
Colorado mechanic's lien statute (not found in the Utah statute)
required proof of mailing to establish a valid mechanic's lien in
Colorado.

In the other cases, unlike this case, the issue of

notice was litigated at trial.
In Daniel vs. M.J. Development, Inc., 603 P.2d 947 (Colo.
App. 1979), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that, under the
Colorado mechanic's lien statute, proof of notice was required to
establish a valid mechanic's lien.

The Court based it's holding

on the language of Section 38-22-109(3) Colorado Revised
2

Statutes, which provides:
In order to preserve any lien for work
performed or materials furnished, there must
be a notice of intent to file a lien
statement served upon the owner or reputed
owner of the property or his agent...at least
ten days before the time of filing the lien
statement with the county clerk and recorder.
Id. at 948-49 (citing Section 38-22-109(3) Colorado Revised
Statutes).
The court also based its holding on legislative history that
demonstrated a "clear legislative intent to require the statutory
notice in order to perfect a valid lien." _Id. at 949.

The

Colorado Court of Appeals held that "lien claimants must prove
compliance with the statute upon remand in order to establish a
valid lien."

_Id. at 949.

In this case, there is no such language in the Utah Statute.
Judge Hilder found that plaintiff had a valid mechanic's lien,
even though there was no proof of mailing.
appeal that ruling.

Defendant did not

Furthermore, Section 38-1-7(3) is worded in

the negative, unlike the Colorado statute:
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the
reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien
claimant from an award of costs and attorneys1 fees
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action
to enforce the lien.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-7(3).
As discussed in Appellant's Brief, a defense under Section 38-17(3) must be raised by the defendant at trial or it is waived,
just as any other statutory defense such as the statute of
3

frauds, statute of limitations or governmental immunity.
In all of the remaining cases cited by defendant from other
jurisdictions the issue of notice was raised at trial and
adjudicated on the merits.

In Morse Bros. Contractors Inc. v.

C.J.H. Construction Co., 675 P.2d 1122 (Or. App. 1984), the issue
of notice under the Oregon mechanic's lien statute was raised at
trial and both the trial court and appellate court held that the
notice requirement had been complied with.1
In Northlake Concrete Products, Inc. vs. Wylie, 663 P.2d
1380, 1381 (Wash. App. 1983), the defendant raised failure to
give notice pursuant to the Washington mechanic's lien statute in

defendant quotes the following language from that case out
of context: "To entitle a lien claimant to costs and attorney's
fees, compliance with the notice requirements must be pleaded and
approved."
(Brief of Appellee Michael Kampros, page 18.) This
is simply a paraphrase of Oregon Revised Statutes 87.057(3),
which states that "A plaintiff or cross-complainant seeking to
foreclose a lien in a suit to foreclose shall plead and prove
compliance with [the notice requirements]." .Id. at 1123.
Defendant also misleads the court by only quoting part of
Oregon Revised Statute, Section 87.057(3). The entire section is
as follows:
A plaintiff or cross-complainant seeking to
foreclose a lien in a suit to foreclose shall
plead and prove compliance with [the notice
requirements]. No costs, disbursements, or
attorney's fees otherwise allowable as
provided by ORS 87.060 shall be allowed to
any party failing to comply with the
provisions of this section.
Or. Rev. Stet. 87.057 (3) .
Corresponding language is not found in the Utah Mechanic's lien
statute.
4

a motion for summary judgment.

In Kopp's Rug Co., Inc. vs.

Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167 (Kan. App. 1980), the defendant likewise
raised the issue of compliance with the notice requirement under
the Kansas mechanic's lien statute at trial.

In that case, the

court concluded that the "service of notice of the mechanic's
lien sufficiently complied with" the applicable statute.
1170.

,Id. at

Similarly, in Williams v. A.J. Bayless Markets, Inc., 476

P.2d 869 (Ariz. App. 1970), the issue of notice was raised at
trial. _Id. at 871.

The court ruled that, although notice was

given, the notice was not given "within a reasonable time" after
recording the claim of lien, as required by Arizona statute.

Id.

at 874.
In this case, Mr. Kampros did not raise the notice issue
until after the trial, arguing for the first time in his Motion
for Reconsideration that it was part of plaintiff's "prima facie"
case and that he had no duty to raise the issue at trial as an
"avoidance or affirmative defense" to plaintiff's claim for
attorney's fees.

As set forth in plaintiff's Motion to Reopen

for Limited Purpose, the notice requirement under Section 38-17(3) was complied with but because defendant did not raise the
defense at trial, the issue was not adjudicated on the merits.
B.

The Two Utah Cases Cited by Defendant Involve Lack of

Jurisdiction.
Next, defendants rely on the Utah cases of AAA Fencing
Company vs. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) and
5

Govert Copier Painting vs. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App.
1990).

The issue in those cases was whether the 12-month

"statute of limitations" under 38-1-11 was a "statute of
limitations'' or "jurisdictional." In both cases, the Utah courts
held it was jurisdictional.
In AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d
289 (Utah 1986), the court stated:
Properly framed, the issue before us is whether an untimely
action under our mechanics1 lien statute affects the rights
or merely the remedies of the parties. We disagree with
plaintiffs that it affects merely their remedies and is
therefore subject to waiver and estoppel as are procedural
statutes of limitations and hold instead that it is
jurisdictional and forecloses their rights...
Id. at 290-91. (Emphasis added.)
[F]ailure to enforce a mechanic's lien within the
statutory period is a jurisdictional question....
Id. at 291. (Emphasis added.)
[T]he Court is without jurisdiction to entertain such
an action as this when the period of its availability
has expired.
Id. at 292.

(Emphasis added.)

Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time.

Rule 12(h)(2),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch.
Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) ("[A] lack of jurisdiction
can be raised at any time by either party or by the court.")
In Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah
App. 1990), the court cited AAA Fencing Company in also holding
that the 12-month "statute of limitations" under Section 38-1-11
6

is jurisdictional:
In AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy
Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) (per curiam),
the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The time for
enforcing mechanic's liens set out in section
38-1-11... limits a lienor's rights to twelve
months after his work is completed. At that
point, both his rights and his remedies under
the statute are extinguished."
Govert at 173.
The notice requirement under section 38-1-7(3) is not
jurisdictional.
C.

The General Rules For Determining "Prima Facie"

Elements Are the Same for Both Statutory Claims and Tort Claims.
Finally, defendant argues that the general rules for
determining the prime facie elements of a claim are different for
statutory claims than for tort claims.

(Brief of Appellee

Michael Kampros, page 20-22.) This is not true.

For example, in

Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah
1998), plaintiff brought a statutory claim for unlawful detainer
pursuant to Section 78-36-1 et seq.

Defendant failed to raise a

statute of limitations defense under Section 78-12-29(2) or a
defective summons defense under Section 78-36-8.

The court held

both were affirmative defenses that defendant had waived by
failing to raise at trial;
Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[a] party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present either
by motion...or, if he has made no motion, in
his answer or reply." Utah R.Civ.P. 12(h).
A party waives a statute of limitations
7

defense by failing to raise it in a
responsive pleading or by motion before
submitting a responsive filing. [Citation
Omitted.] Likewise, a party's failure to
comply with section 78-36-8fs indorsement
requirement is a waive able defense.
[Citation Omitted.] Because Youngblood failed
to raise the statute of limitations and
statutory compliance defenses before he
submitted a response - in this case his trial
brief - he waived those defenses.
Id. at 106.
In this case, defendant failed to raise noncompliance with
Section 38-1-7(3) as a defense at trial and therefore waived it.
Section 38-1-7(3) is an "avoidance or affirmative defense"
to a claim for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, and not an
element of the prima facie case.

Defendant failed to raise the

issue of notice either in his pleadings or at trial and has
waived that defense.
II. IN THE EVENT NOTICE UNDER SECTION 38-1-7(3)
IS AN ELEMENT OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
UNDER SECTION 38-1-18, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON WHETHER NOTICE WAS GIVEN UNDER
SECTION 38-1-7(3).
In the event notice under Section 38-1-7(3) is an element of
a prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18,
then plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for Limited Purposes should be
granted.

The case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing

on whether the notice requirement under Section 38-1-7(3) was
satisfied.
Defendant's argument that plaintiff's pleadings were legally
insufficient is inaccurate. Attached hereto are the following:
8

1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for

Limited Purposes, dated August 21, 1997.2
2.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen

Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated August 21, 1997.3
3.

Affidavit of Russell A. Cline, dated August 21, 1997.4

4.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen

Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated September 10, 1997.
Those pleadings were legally sufficient to present the issue to
the trial court. Although the "plaintiff" J.V. Hatch
Construction did not file an affidavit, plaintiff's counsel,
Russell A. Cline, did file an affidavit.

Furthermore, the

specific grounds for the motion under Rule 59 were fully set
forth in the reply memorandum.
Certainly plaintiff was "surprised" when the trial judge
reversed his earlier decision that compliance with Section 38-17(3) was a defense that must be raised by defendant.

"Ordinary

prudence" could not have guarded against the trial judge later
reversing his decision.

Once the trial court reversed its

earlier ruling and added a new element, it was an abuse of
discretion to deny plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for the Limited
2

Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael
Kampros, at pp. 58-59.
3

Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael
Kampros, at pp. 60-61.
4

Also set forth in Addendum to Brief of Appellee Michael
Kampros, at pp. 55-57.
9

Purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter —

that the

mailing requirement was complied with.
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to attorney's fees
should he prevail is also inaccurate. A party is only entitled
to attorney's fees on appeal if he was the successful party
below.

See R & R Energies vs. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936

P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997).
general rule.

Section 38-1-18 does not change the

Section 38-1-18 awards attorney's fees to the

successful party "in any action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter."

The successful party in the action to "enforce

the lien" was plaintiff, not defendant.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the lower court and find that a
prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 does
not include proof of mailing.

The Court should remand the case

for a determination of attorneys fees for both the trial and for
this appeal.

In the alternative, this Court should remand for a

determination at to whether Section 38-1-7(3) was complied with.
Dated this ^L^

day of September, 1998.

Michael W. Crippen'

f

yRussell A. Cline
^Attorneys for
J.V. Hatch Construction Inc.
10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 3^2-. day of September, 1998,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's
Reply Brief were mailed first class postage prepaid to:
David Overholt
Richer, Swan & Overholt
6925 So. Union Park Center
Suite 450
Midvale, UT 84047
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APPENDICES
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for

Limited Purposes, dated August 21, 1997.
2.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen

Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated August 21, 1997.
3.

Affidavit of Russell A. Cline, dated August 21, 1997.

4.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen

Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose, dated September 10, 1997.

12

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Attorney for Plaintiff
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street Suite #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH,

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC.
Plaintiff,

I

MOTION TO REOPEN PLAINTIFF'S
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE

s

VS.

i

MICHAEL KAMPROS,

!

CIVIL NO. 950010438
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER

Defendant.

Inasmuch as defendant has filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the issue of whether the compliance with the mailing requirement
is an affirmative

defense, plaintiff

hereby moves to reopen

plaintiff's case for the limited purpose of introducing the return
receipt as evidence that the mailing requirement was complied with.
The grounds therefore are more fully set forth in the accompanying
memorandum.

OCM.i..

DATED this

nx

day of August, 1997.

issell A. Cline
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy
Ludlow, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on
this

*H. day of August, 1997.

000

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Attorney for Plaintiff
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street Suite #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH,

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC.
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REOPEN PLAINTIFF'S
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE

i

vs.

:
i
i

MICHAEL KAMPROS,
Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 950010438
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER

:

Inasmuch as defendant has filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of

whether

compliance

with

the

mailing

requirement

is

an

affirmative defense, plaintiff should be allowed to reopen its case
for the limited purpose of demonstrating that in fact the mailing
requirement was complied with.
of

form

over

substance.

Defendant's maneuvering is a matter
Defendant

requirement was complied with.

knows

that

the

mailing

Rather than allowing defendant to

00(M

raise by innuendo the implication that mailing did not occur,
Plaintiff should have the opportunity o£ introducing evidence that
it did.
DATED this *2J day of August, 1997.

Russell A. Cline
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy
Ludlow, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on
this ^

day of August, 1997.

ixt/t

00f<
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Russell A. Cllne (4298)
Attorney for Plaintiff
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street Suite #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC.
Plaintiff,
VS.

AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL CLINE
:
!

MICHAEL KAMPROS,

Defendant.

:
:

CIVIL NO. 950010438
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Russell A. Cline, being duly sworn, does say and depose as
follows:
1.

Within a day or two after the Notice of Lien was filed on

August 31, 1995, I caused a copy thereof to be mailed to Michael
Kampros by certified mail.
2.

Attached hereto is a copy of the green card that was

000.55

returned*

It shows that the date of delivery was September 2, 1995

and the date of return was September 5, 1995.
3.

I understood Michael Kampros to be the 'reputed owner"

after his mother's death as personal representative of his mother's
estate.

As it turns out, he was the actual owner*

Dated this 'TA day of August, 1997.

sell A. Cline

Sworn and subscribed before me this ^1/^
NOTARY PUBLIC
JANICE ANN 8. QARNER
880 North 325 W«t
Bountiful, ITT 84010
MyComnteJonBqptrw
June 7.2001
STATE OP UTAH

Day of August, 1997.

Notary Public

2
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Russell A. Cline (4298)
Attorney for Plaintiff
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street Suite #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC.
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN
CASE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE

vs.
MICHAEL KAMPROS,

CIVIL NO. 950010438
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
there are ample grounds to reopen this case for the limited purpose
of demonstrating that the mailing requirement was complied with.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
Court may "take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions" for a
number of reasons, including 1) "[a]ccident or surprise, which

ordinary

prudence

could

not

have

guarded

against/

and

2)

"[iInsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision:"
The court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
•• •

(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
•• •

(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
In

this

case, plaintiff

has

treated

this

issue

as

an

affirmative defense and if this Court reconsiders and reverses its
prior ruling, there is sufficient "accident or surprise" to justify
plaintiff's

introduction of evidence demonstrating complieuice with

the mailing requirement. Similarly, to the extent that this court
reconsiders and reverses its prior ruling, there is insufficiency
of the evidence" as to whether the mailing requirement was actually
complied with.
In a similar case, In Re Logan Riverf

780 P.2d 1241 (Utah

1989), the Court reopened the case to admit into evidence exhibits
that were attached to post-trial memorandum.
follows:
2

The Court stated as

In an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry
of a new judgment.
The basis for a motion
made for the purpose of so amending a judgment
are delineated in the rule, those pertinent to
this proceeding being accident, surprise,
newly discovered evidence, or insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the decision... [I]t
lies within the sound discretion of the court
to reopen the case.
Id^. at 1245.
Similarly, in this case, plaintiff has attached a copy of the
return

receipt

requirements
consideration

as

demonstrating
an

exhibit

by the Court.

compliance
to

a

with

post-trial

the

mailing

memorandum

for

This should be introduced into

evidence.
Defendant's assertion that "a case may not be reopened for
presentation of evidence which was in a parties control at the time
of trial" is absolutely false. The case cited by defendant, Powers
v. Gene's Building Materialsf 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977), involves a
motion for a new jury trial, not a motion to reopen a bench trial
to take limited additional testimony.

In Powersf after a jury

rendered a verdict against defendants, defendants moved for a new
jury trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

The Court

denied that motion on the grounds that the "new evidence" was
"subject to discovery and could have been obtained by the exercise
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of ordinary diligence."
This case does not involve a motion for a new jury trial, but
a motion

to open a bench trial for the limited purpose of

demonstrating that the mailing requirement was complied with.

As

stated in Logan Riverf "In an action tried without a jury, the
Court may open the judgment if one has been entered, to take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law
or make new findings and conclusions... and it lies within the
sound discretion of the court to reopen the case."
Mr. Kampros seeks reconsideration of a ruling based on the
assertion that the mailing rule was not complied with, but asks the
Court to deny a motion to introduce evidence to demonstrate the
truth of the matter.

Mr. Kampros cannot have it both ways.

If

this Court reconsiders the issue of whether the compliance with the
mailing requirement is an affirmative defense, then the Court
should

also

allow

evidence

demonstrating

that

the

mailing

requirement was complied with.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for
Limited Purpose should be granted.
DATED this

iO

day of September, 1997.

Russell A. Cline
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing pleading was mailed, postage pre-paid to Randy
Ludlow, 336 South 300 East, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on
this

\y

day of September, 1997.
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